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On December 10, 2001 the US Department of Commerce announced the imposition 
of steep antidumping duties against honey imports from Argentina and China ranging from 
32.6% to 183.8%, and a countervailing duty against Argentina of 5.9%. A previous AD 
investigation was concluded in 1995 with a suspension “agreement” that curtailed US 
imports from China by around 30%. Millions of beekeepers around the world most of them 
poor, are making a living from honey production and for them, a free and competitive 
world market would strengthen their possibilities of raising their standards of living. 
Nevertheless, the sequential pattern of increasing and widening protectionism followed by 
the US, the world top importer, to include successful exporters under the effects of its 
contingent protection measures, sends a clear message that other countries should think 
twice before investing in expanding honey exports to the US.  
 
In addition to looking into the trade effects of these contingent protection measures, 
this paper concludes that under the regulatory arrangements of the US Department of 
Commerce (DOC), Argentina’s beekeepers never had a chance of defending themselves. 
For example, responding to the DOC´s lengthy and sophisticated questionnaires that sought 
to determine cost of production, went beyond the capacities of poor beekeepers. In the 
absence of this information, the DOC resorted to the evidence presented by the Petitioners 
which apparently, was riddled with errors. The available evidence suggest that had 
beekeepers being capable of  responding the questionnaires, the margin of dumping would 
had been lower if at all existent. This and other evidence discussed in the paper suggest the 
urgent need to introduce reforms into the WTO antidumping and subsidy agreements. At 
the minimum what is required is a consensus that all Respondents will be given the same 
opportunity by the international trade rules. The paper argues that at present, this is not the 
case and the final section offers some suggestions for reforms.I. Introduction 
 
  On December 10, 2001 the US Department of Commerce announced the imposition 
of steep antidumping duties against honey imports from Argentina and China ranging from 
32.6% to 183.8%, and a countervailing duty against Argentina of 5.9%. These are the latest 
measures taken by the US Government in a history of support to this industry that spans 
more than fifty years. This protectionism by the major honey importer has often 
destabilized the world market and increased poverty abroad.  
 
  Although this paper analyzes trade and development aspects of the recent measures 
against Argentina, the discussion also illustrates effects on other exporting and importing 
countries. I start by noting in Section II, opposing  international competitive trends between 
Argentina and the US the first becoming a world top exporter while the second, becoming 
increasingly import-dependent. This Section also provides an overview of the very long 
history of subsidy and protection policies that have been granted to the US beekeepers. 
Following this presentation, the rest of the analysis will address three questions: What can 
we learn from the procedures applied in this investigation by US authorities? How 
effectively did Argentina’s private and public sectors defended themselves against the 
accusations of being unfair traders and, What impacts did the contingent protection 
measures have? Section III offers a detailed analysis of some aspects of the dumping and 
subsidy investigation undertaken by the Department of Commerce (DOC). A major 
conclusion of this analysis is that some regulations are so complex and demanding that they 
are difficult if not impossible to meet which in turn, results in protectionism against their 
exports. Section IV takes up the defense offered by Argentina. This discussion indicates a 
striking difference between the degree of cohesion among the different actors in the US, 
and those same actors in Argentina. Section V presents an analysis of some of the effects of 
the protective measures paying particular attention to: (i) trade effects including those of 
recently imposed sanitary measures against honey imports from China, (ii) social 
implications and, (iii) the costs of the contingent protection measures to the US consumers. 
Finally in Section VI, I present some suggestions for the Doha negotiations. These 
recommendations are based on the finding that even for a medium income country like  
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Argentina, both the private and public sectors face serious difficulties in meeting the 
requirements of sophisticated US regulations for administering its contingent protection 
policies. This state of affairs should not remain unchanged.     
 
II. International Competitiveness  
 
The discussion in this Section is based on two pieces of information. I start by 
reviewing the statistical evidence on international competitive trends and then summarize 
the salient policies that have entailed long-standing subsidies and protection to the US 
honey producers.  
 
1. Statistical evidence 
 
There is every indication that in terms of international competitiveness of the honey 
producing industry, Argentina holds one of the leading positions. To illustrate this, Table 1 
presents honey exports from 1990 to 2000 by the major exporting countries
1. This data 
shows that the highest increase in exports is recorded for Argentina who went from 
                                                 
1 At the time of this writing (mid 2002), FAO database did  not include trade statistics for 2001. 
Table 1: Exports by Major Honey Exporting Countries 
1990-2000 (Thousands of tons) 
Country  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2000/1990
Argentina  40 47 55 55 62 64 48 70 68 93 88  2,23 
Canada  8 10  11 8  9 16  10 8 11  15  16  2.00 
China  88 70 92 97  102  87 84 48 79 87  103  1.17 
Germany  13 11 12 14 14 15 16 13 14  1  22  1.71 
Mexico  44 50 36 36 30 26 29 27 32 22 31  0.71 
World  291 280 281 298 314 301 294 272 307 340 370  1.27 
Source: FAOSTAT  
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supplying 14% of world exports in 1990, to 24% in 2000
2. During this ten year period, 
honey exports by China, the most important world exporter accounting for around one third 
of world exports, only increased by 17%. As indicated below, this figure is not so much an 
indication of China’s competitiveness but at least in part, the outcome of US protection 
against honey imports from this country in a previous antidumping (AD) case that ended in 
1995 in a Suspension “Agreement”.  
 
Table 2 presents data on production and trade for the major exporting countries for 
year 2000. The numbers indicate that Argentina is by far the most export-oriented country 
in the sample. The figures also show that Germany is a major importer and exporter mainly 
to other countries in the EU.  
 
Graph 1 shows honey production and exports by Argentina between 1990 and 2001.  
                                                 
2 More recently, this trend has been reinforced by the trade effects of the sanitary problems implemented 
against China in early 2002. As discussed in Section V, for the first five months of 2002, the tonnage exported 
by Argentina surpassed that of China by 74% (www.beekeeping.com). 
Table 2: Production and Trade in a Sample of 
Countries, 2000 
0,29 438.042 370.878 370.431 436.260 1.256.594 World
0,09 89.890 96.018 8.121 4.746 94.000 U.S.
0,55 58 129 31.115 34.805 56.844 Mexico
0,91 95.016 104.894 22.307 38.606 24.638 Germany
0,41 3.552 2.858 103.042 86.892 253.691 China
0,48 2.824 3.195 15.513 21.117 32.000 Canada
0,95 14 65 88.467 87.203 93.000 Argentina
Export/ 
Prod.






The data indicates that starting in 1996 export growth accelerated. This is due in part to the 
1995 AD measure imposed by the US against China. While this helped exports from other 
exporting countries, I don’t believe that the growth performance of Argentina’s  exports 
should be attributed exclusively to the opportunity opened by this  restriction. Following 
the suspension agreement with China, other countries did not increase exports to the US as  
fast as Argentina did. Furthermore, Argentina’s exports also increased fast to other 
countries like Germany where it was competing head-on with China: exports to this market 
more than doubled increasing from U$S10.8 million dollars in 1990 to U$S27.5 million 
dollars in 2000.       
Graph 1: Honey Production and Exports 























Table 3: Major Honey Importers 
1990-2000 (Thousands of Tons)* 
 
*Ranked by Imports in 2000. 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2000/1990 
Germany  79 89 89 81 83 89 88 83 94 90 95  1.20 
United 
States 
35 42 52 61 56 41 68 76 60 83 90  2.57 
Japan  69 39 32 36 40 39 42 34 29 35 40  0.58 
United 
Kingdom 
26 22 23 18 13 14 21 21 25 23 23  0.86 
France  8 7 8 6 9  12  13  12  13  15  16  2.18 
Total  294 274 296 285 297 308 342 320 326 349 371  1.26 
Source: FAOSTAT  
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Graph 2: Number of Bee Colonies in Argentina 















Table 3 presents the major honey importers during 1990-2000 ranked according to imports 
in 2000. The figures show that while world imports increased by 26% in this ten year 
period, US imports increased by 118%. Clearly, US consumption has become more 
dependent on foreign supply and as seen below, this occurred in spite of Government 
supported honey programs that have been in place for decades, and in spite of the 1995 AD 
measure against China. 
 
The high dependency of the US on honey imports is seen more clearly in the data 
reported in Table 2. With a value of 89%, the US import to production ratio is the highest 
in this sample of countries and as said, it has been increasing fast. For example according to 
FAO statistics, while the average import-production ratio was 41% during 1989-1991, for 
the 1998-2000 period this figure climbed to 80%. This increasing dependency took place 
against a stagnant output. Thus, while the average annual honey production for the years 
1989 to 1991 was 90,000 tons, this figure increased to 96,423 tons during 1998-2000 i.e. by 
7%. In contrast, during the same years Argentina’s output nearly doubled and world output 
increased by around 30% (www.beekeeping.com). The US stagnation occurred in spite of 
subsidies and protectionist policies while Argentina’s growth happened quite naturally.   
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  As shown in Graph 2, the relative stagnation of US honey production has its 
counterpart in the number of bee colonies that between 1990 and 1999 declined from 3,210 
millions to 2,640 millions, i.e. a reduction of 18%. This compares with Argentina where the 
number of bee colonies increased by 57% during the same period (Alberta, 2001)
3.  
Differences in natural comparative advantage appear to explain most of the relative 
trade performance between Argentina and the US. For example, a number of characteristics 
allows honey quality to be rated by international markets and the results of one study are 
summarized in Table 4. In addition to product quality, the numbers in the last column 
include ratings of production costs and of marketing efficiency. Based on these 
characteristics, this study concludes that: “While China is extremely cost competitive 
today, its prominence in global honey trade appears set for decline owing to labor supply 
limitations and … increasing costs in accessing floral sources and a host of other issues. 
Given the competitive disadvantages in the United States, further reductions in the number 
of beekeepers and hives remains likely unless government subsidies or anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties compensate their cost disadvantage. Conversely, US beekeepers may 
                                                 
3 According to data from the Secretaría de Agricultura of Argentina, after 1999 the number of bee colonies 
continued to increase reaching 2.4 million in 2001. 
Table 4: Honey Quality and Overall Scores
4.5 84 89 71 45 80 87 U.S.
7.9 67 74 85 46 81 48 China
8.8 64 93 74 52 91 84 Canada
9.0 85 82 87 53 79 76 Argentina
Overall 
Score
Cristallization Purity Drums Food 
Safety
Color Taste Country
Source: Alberta (2001) 
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become increasingly competitive in niche markets. Alberta has the advantage of cost-
effectively producing high-quality white honey with the US, its main export market, 
nearby; strategic marketing could further enhance competitiveness. Argentina is cost 
competitive, produces good quality honey, and markets honey reasonably well, ensuring it 
a continued position of dominance in world  trade” (Alberta, 2001, page iii; underline is 
mine).  
 




  Having argued that honey production in the US is a declining industry, it is no 
surprise that it is resisting its demise by seeking subsidies and protection from the 
Government.  Going as far back as the late 40s, US honey producers have been receiving 
Government support. In 1949 honey production was included in the Agriculture Act and for 
decades it received assistance in the form of subsidized loan rates. Starting in 1951, this 
program was split into two parts: a loan program, and a guaranteed purchase program. The 
loan program which was available during the production season, sought to avoid putting the 
farmer in a situation of having to sell his honey in months of declining prices. If at the time 
of loan repayment prices continued depressed, the farmer had the option of forfeiting his 
honey to the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) without recourse.   
 
  Over time, this policy heightened market instability when the accumulated honey at 
the CCC was put for sale, or given as a food assistance program
5. In order to reduce these 
instabilities, this program was amended with the aim of transforming it into a true loan 
program where the risk was assumed by the producer. In the 1995 Farm Bill, the recourse 
loan program for honey was eliminated but only for a brief period as it was reestablished in 
1998.  
 
                                                 
4 The analysis under this heading is taken mainly from Alberta (2001) and ITC (2001). 
5 Thus, in the early 80s, “a massive 100 million pounds of forfeited honey reentered the US marketplace with 
extremely negative market consequences” for producers and exporters (Alberta, 2001, page 59). 
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  Another modification increasing the implicit subsidy was introduced in the 
Agriculture Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2001. The key provision of this legislation is 
that the recourse non-purchase loan rate program that was in effect until then, was switched 
to a non-recourse purchase loan rate program or loan deficiency payment program. These 
changes in effect brought the nature of Government support closer to what it was before the 
reform of the 1980s. Some details of this program are: (i) the loan rate is established at 
$0.65 dollars per pound, (ii) honey can be forfeited to satisfy the loan, (iii) the loan may be 
repaid at the lower of the loan rate plus interest, or the prevailing domestic price as 
established by the USDA, (iv) a loan deficiency payment will be available for the 
difference between $0.65 dollars per pound and the market price. Because at the time of 
introducing this program the market price is estimated to have been around $0.52 dollars 
per pound, the subsidy rate was in the order of 25% (Alberta, 2001 p. 59)
6. Finally, the 
2002 Farm Bill has made this a longer lasting program and for its first year, the loan rate 
has been established at 0.60 dollars per pound (www.usda.gov). 
 
  US honey producers have also requested import protection. In 1976 the ITC 
undertook an investigation under Section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act (ITC, 2001). It 
concluded that increasing import quantities threatened causing injury to the domestic 
industry and recommended instituting a tariff-quota in order to avoid damage. 
Nevertheless, President Ford recommended to the Congress that import relief for the US 
honey industry was not in the national economic interest and the measures never came into 
effect.  
 
  In 1993 and upon request from the USTR, the ITC initiated an investigation under 
Section 406 (a) of the Trade Act of 1974. Again it found that imports from China were 
increasing rapidly and were a significant cause of market disruption to the domestic 
industry. Once again, the US President determined that import relief for honey was not in 
the national economic interest and directed the USTR to monitor imports from China. 
 
                                                 
6 The subsidy was capped at $0.15 per pound and a maximum of $150,000 dollars per beekeeper. 
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  In 1994, the American Beekeeping Federation (ABF) and the American Honey 
Producers Association (AHPA) changed their strategy and this time filed a petition alleging 
that the domestic industry was being injured by “less than fair-value” imports from China. 
Preliminary affirmative determinations of injury and of dumping margins ranging from 
128% to 157% put China against the wall. Subsequently in August of 1995, under pressing 
circumstances, China concluded an “agreement” with the DOC that suspended the 
investigation. This agreement obliged China to restrict the volume of honey exports to the 
US to 20,000 tons per year. An idea of how restrictive this measure was, is given by the 
fact that during 1992-1994 (the three preceding years), the average US annual import 
volume from China was 31,000 tons suggesting that the “agreement” led to a 30% 
reduction in trend imports from this country. In addition to the quantity restriction, the 
“agreement” also instituted a pricing mechanism according to which exports could not be 
sold at a price below a reference price
7. This was a five-year agreement that concluded in 
August 1, 2000.  
 
  The suspension with China was scheduled for its sunset revision in July of 2000 but 
since no domestic party expressed interest in its continuation, it was terminated. In fact, the 
interest in import protection was higher than ever but this time the domestic industry had 
devised an improved protectionist strategy. In September of 2000 and after the termination 
of the agreement, the US industry petitioned new antidumping investigations against 
Argentina and China, and an antisubsidy investigation against Argentina
8. Clearly, US 
producers had concluded that: (i) a completed antidumping investigation would be more 
protectionist than one terminated in a suspension agreement and, (ii) that Argentina which 
had become a competitive exporter, should also be included. In November of 2000, the 
DOC agrees to open these investigations. On December 10, 2001 the  DOC issued AD 
orders against imports from Argentina  that ranged from 32.6% to 60.7%, and against 
                                                 
7 This reference price was equal to 92 percent of the weighted-average of the honey unit import values from 
all other countries for the most recent six months of data available at the time the reference price is calculated. 
(ITC, 2001).  
 
8 The petition was filed by AHPA, Bruce South Dakota, and the Sioux Honey Association which together 
represent a little more than 50% of the industry (ITC, 2001). 
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imports from China that ranged from 25.9% to 183.8%. The DOC also issued a 5.85% 
countervailing duty (CVD) against Argentina.   
 
Summing-up, the statistical trends discussed in this section indicate quite clearly 
that in the US, honey production is a declining industry. Here, honey output has stagnated 
while imports have continued to increase and this has occurred in spite of Government 
financed support and high protection against imports from China. In contrast, Argentina’s 
exports have been increasing at a fast pace to several markets including the US. Likewise, 
the evidence on economic policies indicate that the US honey industry has been subsidized 
for several decades and more recently, it is also being protected with high import barriers. 
 
 
III. US AD and CVD Investigations 
  
During the years of the previous AD investigation (1994-1995), China accounted 
for around 30% of US imports but in 2000, Argentina plus China accounted for 79%; a 
significant increase in the US import coverage of its protective measures 
(www.beekeeping.com). What can we learn from the recent investigation undertaken by the 
DOC? In order to answer this question, this section starts by focusing on the investigations 
against Argentina. After this, I present brief comments on the proposed suspension 
agreement, and the injury determination by the US International Trade Commission (ITC, 
2001). 
 
1. The dumping investigation: determining the  cost of honey production 
 
  The most troublesome aspect of the AD investigation is the chain of events 
following the decision by the DOC to assess the margin of dumping against an estimate of 
the cost of producing honey. Its initial attempt was to estimate this cost directly from honey  
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producers and here a first problem was to locate them. One of the  Case Brief (1)
9, indicates 
that the difficulty in obtaining data from small-scale beekeepers “is illustrated by the plight 
of the Federal Express packages sent by the Department to the cost respondents. Of the 48 
potential cost respondents selected by the Department to receive the first questionnaire, 
Federal Express was unable to deliver a package to 22 of them. Of the 26 “successful” 
deliveries, at one location there was a ladies clothing store, not beehives; at one location the 
inhabitants had never heard of the intended recipient; in another case neither the addresses 
nor the business existed in the destination village; at three locations the owners had stopped 
harvesting honey long ago; and in at least one case the Federal Express envelope arrived 
without the questionnaire inside. In short, as the Departments first questionnaire should had 
driven home, it was a fiction to assume that accurate data from the beekeepers was 
obtainable” (Case Brief 1, page 14-15
10).  
 
Later for a smaller sample of around twelve beekeepers, the DOC sent its lengthy 
and sophisticated questionnaire that none of them could complete the reasons being lack of 
knowledge of the english language, plus poor or non-existing records required by the DOC 
in order to support the answers. Sending sophisticated questionnaires to poor beekeepers 
who could not respond, is an example that a rules-based system does not necessarily imply 
that all are given the same opportunities under it. As argued in the final Section, this 
happened in spite of promises to the contrary made in the Uruguay Round. 
 
  After this failed attempt of estimating cost of production with information provided 
by Argentina’s beekeepers, the DOC had some degrees of freedom regarding the evidence 
on which to estimate the margin of dumping. The DOC could had taken more market-
                                                 
9 Unless otherwise indicated, reference to Case Brief in this section refers to that presented by ACA (Case 
Brief 1, 2001). Other Case Briefs as well determinations published in the Federal Register in reference to 
these AD and CVD cases are listed in the bibliography. At the time, ACA was the most important exporter.   
 
10 Even a big firm like ACA, was hard pressed to complete its questionnaire on time. My interview with this 
firm also indicates  that important amounts of administrative resources had to be devoted during several 
months to this case. As an example, the verification undertaken by the DOC included the elaboration of 
documentation that is included in four volumes. If this happened to the biggest exporter, it is reasonable to 
presume that expecting a small beekeeper to respond to the DOCs  complex and sophisticated questionnaire 
was unreasonable. See Boltuck and Litan  (1991) for an elaboration of the harassment that goes with AD and 
CVD investigations undertaken by the DOC. 
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oriented approaches instead of relying on constructed cost structures as it finally did. For 
example, it could had used export prices to some destination other than the US and the 
obvious candidate would had been sales to Germany where Argentina also exports heavily. 
Apparently, this alternative was never seriously considered..  
 
In the end, the DOC used reconstructed costs and assessed the margin of dumping 
with this methodology which has been severely critized by prominent analysts (Finger, 
1993 and Krueger, 1995). In essence, the DOC concluded that the best available evidence 
on cost of production, was the one that had been presented by the Petitioners. This evidence 
was published in a second rate journal called Gestión Apícola that had been in print for a 
brief number of months before the petition was filed and has by now gone out of print
11. 
The DOC characterized this as the only piece of “independent evidence” on which to base 
the case
12. As expected, the decision to use this data opened the door to a debate on the 
appropriateness of different assumptions used in these estimates. The Argentine exporters 
argued that they contained several errors and that either the DOC should discard them or at 
the very least, should adjust them. The petitioners objected to all of these arguments and in 
the end, the DOC concluded that: “We agree with the petitioners” (DOC a, page 11; 
underline is mine).  
 
Some examples of the discussion that went on illustrates the type of Pandora box 
that was opened when non-market data was used to make the determination on cost of 
production. The following are three examples: (1) Joint production. The exporters argued 
that in the production process of honey, other products can also be jointly produced. But the 
denominator of the cost in Gestión Apícola did not include an estimate of the income 
                                                 
11  A lucky coincidence for the Petitioners? The argument by the DOC was that these costs were used  
“because these studies were prepared: 1) by an independent author; and 2) not in anticipation or response to 
the antidumping investigation” (DOC a, page 6). Given that the period of these investigations goes from July 
1, 1999 to June 30, 2000, the DOC used the cost of production estimates published in this magazine during 
1999 and 2000. For example, the September 1999 issue of this magazine shows a cost of producing honey of 
$1.27 dollars per kilo or $58 cents per lb. 
 
12 It is of interest to note that an independent estimate arrives at the following cost of production per lb.: 
Argentina: $0.47 dollars; Canada: $0.50 dollars; China: $ 0.42 dollars 19 %,  and the US: $0.65 dollars 
(Alberta, 2001).  This estimate for the US is 38% and 55% above the estimates for Argentina and China 
respectively.  
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generated with the sale of other products and the exporters argued that the DOC 
methodology for treating joint products was not appropriately used in this investigation. By 
one estimate presented in the Case Brief (1), separating the costs of production of honey 
and other products instead of assigning all costs to honey would had reduced the cost of 
production from $1.36 dollars per kilogram to $1.04 dollars per kilogram or $47 dollar 
cents per lb which coincides with the estimate presented in the Alberta study (2001, page 
57). (2) Wax replacement. According to the Case Brief (1), Gestión Apícola seriously 
overestimates several items such as the cost of wax replacement. (3) Feeding and health 
care. According to the Case Brief (1), the feeding costs in Gestión Apícola are 
overestimated by 51%, and the cost of health care of the beehives is overestimated by 33%. 
 
  To conclude, a March 5, 2001 article in the New York Times summarizes well the 
nature and consequences of US regulations: the “United States began its investigation by 
giving producers and exporters 30 days to answer a nearly 150-page questionnaire in 
english, but because they could not understand english, failed to realize what was at stake 
or had incomplete records, the beekeepers did not respond” and, in “the absence of what it 
considered a satisfactory response from beekeepers, American auditors were authorized to 
turn to the best available evidence. That turned out to be a magazine article that producers 
and exporters here say was riddled with errors and false assumptions” (Rohter, 2002). Not 
surprisingly, the final estimated margins of dumping by the DOC indicated that Argentina’s 
and China’s honey exporters were selling at prices that were more than 30% below 
production costs
13. The fact of the matter is that most honey producers in Argentina (and 
other countries) are so poor that they have no capacity to undersell for more than one 
harvest before going out of business
14 but this type of common sense economic reasoning 
has no place in the current WTO and US regulations on contingent protection
15.  
                                                 
13 More concretely, the antidumping duties against Argentina and China are the following: a) Argentina: 
ACA: 37.4%; Radix: 32.6%; Con Agra: 60.7%, and all others: 36.6%, b) China: Inner Mongolia: 57.1%; 
Kunshan: 49.8%; Zheijang: 25.9%; High Hope: 45.5%; Shanghai Eswell and Anhuil and Henan. 45.5%  and 
all others: 183.8%. These barriers are applied on top of a specific import duty of $1.9 dollar cents per pound.  
 
14 One explanation that was given to me of why the cost of production published in Gestión Apícola were 
inflated, had to do with attempts by smallholders honey producers,  to put pressures on exporters to pay better 
prices. This could be the case as none of the major exporters appears to be producing honey i.e. there is a 
clear gap between the interests of exporters and those of the producers with the first apparently holding 
monopsony power over the later.   
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2. The subsidy investigation 
 
Following a positive final injury determination by the ITC, the DOC´s final 
determination issued on October 4, 2001 indicates that the margin of subsidy received by 
Argentina’s honey exports was 5.85%. The petitioners requesting countervailing measures 
were the same as those who requested the antidumping protection against imports from 
Argentina and China. This subsidy investigation covered 31 national, provincial and 
municipal programs of which the DOC found: (i) six to be conferring subsidies, (ii) eight 
not to be conferring subsidies, (iii) ten not in use, (iii) four not in existence and, (iv) three 
had been ended (DOC b)
16.  
 
In the end, most of the countervailing duty countervailed the reintegro program and 
it is of interest to focus on this issue. This program entitle exporters to a rebate of internal 
or domestic taxes levied during the production, distribution and sales process. This rebate is 
paid upon exports and is calculated as a percentage of the FOB invoice price. It should be 
clarified that the reintegro program is the classic rebate of indirect taxes particularly 
important to some developing countries having weak direct tax systems. For closing fiscal 
gaps, governments in these countries resort to a number of measures including the taxation 
of transactions which have the negative effect of increasing production costs. Rebating 
these taxes is the only means of ensuring that they are not exported. 
 
In past subsidy investigation the reintegro program was countervailed following a 
precise methodology according to which the DOC estimated the incidence of indirect taxes 
and countervailed the amount of reintegro that was in excess. The Uruguay Round Subsidy 
Agreement introduced important modifications in the methodology to be followed in the 
assessment of rebates of indirect taxes. In essence the new procedure puts the burden of the 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
15 To be sure, Article 15 of the Antidumping Agreement promises that in AD cases requested in industrial 
countries, developing countries should be treated with some care. In the final Section, I return to this issue. 
 
16 The high number of programs listed in the petition is an indication of the amount of preparatory work that 
went into this case. 
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proof on the exporting country and if its Government cannot demonstrate that the rebate is 
well estimated, then the importing country is free to countervail 100% of the rebate.  
 
The new regulations, which are included in Annex II of the WTO Agreement 
(“Guidelines on Consumption of Inputs in the Production Process”), stipulate that the entire 
amount of the reintegro confers a benefit unless the exporting country Government can 
demonstrate that: (i) it has a procedure to determine which inputs are consumed, in what 
amounts, and which indirect taxes are imposed on them and the system is reasonable for the 
purpose of determining reintegro rates or, if this procedure is not in place, (ii) the 
Government has carried out an “examination” of actual inputs involved to confirm which 
are consumed in the production process of the exported product.  
 
The Government of Argentina (GOA) invested significant amounts of resources in 
order to contest the DOC preliminary decision that its procedure was not a reasonable 
system but in the end its argument failed to make a dent in the final decision. Regarding the 
first alternative, while the DOC acknowledged that the GOA collects information from 
honey producers and is in contact with them, it also argued that it failed to demonstrate that 
it analyzes data as part of a systematic procedure. The fact of the matter is that resources at 
the disposal of the Government are not abundant to operate a system as sophisticated as that 
required by the DOC as complying with the WTO regulations. 
 
Regarding the second alternative, in order to justify reimbursement to honey 
exports, the GOA commissioned a study measuring the incidence of indirect taxes in honey 
exports. The DOC disqualified this study because: (1) it was not based on a representative 
sample of Argentine beekeepers, (2) did not test the inputs and indirect tax incidence 
against actual company experience and, (3) overstated the costs as well as the taxes paid on 
listed inputs (DOC b)
17.  
 
                                                 
17 TIMES (2001) offers a critical analysis of this report.   
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Summing-up, in previous subsidy investigations against Argentina, the DOC had 
adjusted the incidence of indirect taxes when it found evidence of overstatements. In the 
honey case, following the new UR regulations, the DOC determined that all of the reintegro 
should be countervailed. It is apparent that unlike earlier cases, in this case the DOC was 
unwilling to accept any type of analysis on prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes levied on 
inputs consumed in the production process. This happened in spite of the clear fact that at 
least some of these taxes had been paid by honey producers. The system required by the US 
and sanctioned in the WTO Agreement to be in place in the exporting countries is costly 
and therefore, unlikely to be implemented.  In much the same way that in the dumping 
investigation the private-sector beekeepers were unable to meet the demands associated 
with responding lengthy and detailed questionnaires, the Government of Argentina could 
not meet the challenge associated with the new regulations for supporting specific rebate 
rates of indirect taxes. There is no doubt that a trading system without export subsidies 
would entail greater gains to the world economy but the specific regulation addressed 
above, does not move the system in this direction. It simply facilitates protectionism 




3. The proposed suspension agreement 
 
  Article 18 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures regulate 
how undertakings should be negotiated. The US offered Argentina a suspension 
“agreement” but under terms that were clearly injurious to its honey producers and 
exporters; honey exports would be limited to 27,000 tons per year plus the obligation by the 
GOA to eliminate export subsidies and implement a quarterly monitoring system of  prices 
and quantities exported to the US
19. Given that during 1998-2000 the average quantity 
exported by Argentina to the US had been 39,000 tons per year, the undertaking offered by 
                                                 
18 One comment from the referee indicates that in the UR, it was likely that it was the US who pushed for the 
new regulations; presumably because the GATT does not allow rebate of direct taxes, it wants to make it very 
difficult for other countries to receive rebates of indirect taxes. 
 
19 The figure of 27,000 tons is mentioned in an article entitled “Tentative Suspension Agreement Reached in 
Argentine Honey Cases”,  published in the American Bee Journal of October 2001 (page 692).  
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the DOC would had reduced exports by 31%; more or less by the same proportional 
amount that China’s exports were reduced in the 1995 suspension agreement. Under these 
terms, Argentina concluded that such an agreement was not in its interest. 
 
4. Determination of injury by the ITC: the role of prior AD measures 
 
  According to its regulations, in determining whether or not the domestic industry is 
being injured by “dumped and subsidized imports”, the ITC takes into account several 
factors including: (i) the recent behavior of import volumes, (ii) the effect of imports on 
domestic prices and, (iii) other factors that might also account for any injury that is being 
experienced by the industry. During the period under investigation, imports showed a 
strong increasing trend going from 60,000 tons in 1998, to 83,000 tons in 1999, to 90,000 
tons in 2000, and were still increasing in the first semester of 2001 when the ITC was 
investigating this case. Together with the relatively slow growth of domestic production, 
the participation of imports in apparent consumption increased from 28.4% in 1998, to 
36.8% in 1999, to 37.7% in 2000 (ITC, 2001)
20.  
 
  Regarding the effects of imports on domestic prices, the ITC determined that they 
had a negative impact. It should be stressed nevertheless, that domestic prices were coming 
down from the high levels that had been triggered by the 1995 Suspension Agreement with 
China; as new exporters like Argentina entered the scene, international prices began 
declining as evidenced in Graph 3. This suggests that contingent protection measures 
facilitate affirmative injury findings in AD petitions filed at later dates.    
In any case, the presence of lower prices plus evidence on declining profits and 
problems in repayment of loans by beekeepers, were core evidence leading to the positive 
determination by the ITC
21. Obviously, increasing imports and declining prices and profits 
                                                 
20 In this investigation, the ITC proceeded to cumulate imports from Argentina and China, thus increasing the 
likelihood of finding injury. 
 
21 According to the US regulations, the ITC has to consider whether imports are having an impact on the 
fiscal costs of honey supporting programs. The conclusion of this analysis was that during 1999 and 2000, the 
fiscal cost of honey supporting programs had increased. Increasing protection in order to reduce the fiscal cost 
of Government subsidies is bad economics.  
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are also effects that occur naturally in industries that cannot successfully meet international 
Graph 3:
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competition i.e. declining industries which as argued in the previous section, is a 
characteristic that fits the US honey industry. Nevertheless, these type of considerations 
that would push for an improvement in the worldwide allocation of resources are not taken 




The major conclusion of this Section is that existing WTO rules allow Members to 
implement regulations that can turn out to be so complicated not to say costly, that in some 
cases cannot be met by developing country exporters. Argentina’s beekeepers never had a 
chance of responding to lengthy and detailed “cost of production” questionnaires. In the 
absence of this evidence, the DOC turned to estimates that had been presented by the 
Petitioners. These estimates were published in a second rate journal that was in print for a 
little more than the duration of the investigation and that apparently were riddled with 
errors. In the case of the alleged subsidy of the reintegro program, the system required by 
the US and sanctioned in the WTO Agreement, to be in place in the exporting countries is 
costly, and was not implemented by the Government of Argentina at least, not by the level  
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of sophistication required by the DOC. There is no doubt that a trading system without 
export subsidies would entail greater gains to the world economy but the specific regulation 
that I have addressed, does not move the system in this direction. It only benefits US 
producers at a cost to consumers and foreign exporters. 
 
IV. Fragmentation versus Cohesion: Contrasting Argentina with the US 
 
  I believe that under the present US and WTO regulations, there is no strategy that 
could had been successful to impede the imposition of contingent protection measures 
against honey imports from Argentina. Yet, it is  instructive to discuss some striking 
differences in the way that US producers organised themselves behind their petition for 
protection, with the way that Argentina defended itself. The party usually defending a 
subsidy investigation is the Government, and that usually taking up the defense of a 
dumping investigation is the exporting sector. In order to analyze salient characteristics of 
the defense, it is instructive to start separating the analysis along these lines. I conclude the 
Section by contrasting the cohesion behind the petition by the US honey industry with the 
fragmentation shown by different parties in Argentina. 
 
1. Defense in the she subsidy investigation 
 
  The defense of the subsidy allegations in the reintegro and other Government 
supported programs, was complicated by numerous factors including: 
 
-  Difficulties in financing the legal fees that had been budgeted at the quite 
normal value of around $400,000 dollars plus travel and miscellaneous 
expenses. This did not include the defense on the injury investigation by the ITC 
which was financed by a group of exporters. The Province of Buenos, that 
accounts for approximately half the honey produced in Argentina, pledged to put 
half of this amount but finally because of fiscal problems, failed to comply with 
its promise and the National Government had to foot the bill.  
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- Lack of human and financial resources further weakened the capacity of 
different layers of Government to articulate a defense in a coordinated manner
22. 
One example is that an invitation by the National Government to officials from 
the major honey producing provinces that sought to start coordinating the 
defense, was responded negatively by most due to lack of travel budgets. The 
resource constraint was so severe that several express mail envelopes and 
international phone calls were paid by one of the officials who by default of the 
different layers of Government, took the defense of this case as a personal 
challenge. 
 
-  Knowledge with the dimensions of what was at stake, was an added problem as 
most provincial officials ignored the WTO rules and US legislation on unfair 
competition.  
 
-  The time limits of the US regulations also put the Government against the walls. 
All in all for the preliminary determination, the Government received three 
extensive questionnaires from the DOC. In developing answers to these 
questions, some seven volumes containing around 400 pages each were created.    
 
-  Then there is the problem of inter-agency coordination. Given the dispersed 
nature of honey production along a vast territory, the answer to the 
questionnaires by the National Government required the collaboration of some 
17 government and provincial offices. Nevertheless, in Argentina strong inter-
agency coordination is an exception more than the rule and often, the 
consequences of the DOC´s overloaded questionnaires created tensions between 
these offices.  
 
                                                 
22 Several Provinces had also implemented social development programs that supported the incomes of honey 
producers and in spite of this goal, the final determination countervailed some of them. For example, in the 
case of the Province of San Luis, the DOC acknowledged that the promotion of honey production is “to 
supplement the income of disadvantaged people in underdeveloped areas” (DOC b, page 11). A leasing 
program, which essentially was a loan program,  is a component of the social assistance strategy that was 
countervailed because the “verification indicate that there is no expectation by provincial officials that the 
loans will be repaid” (DOC b, page 12).  
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-  In addition to these problems, there were others that also weakened the defense 
by the Government. First, lack or inadequate knowledge of the english language 
by many officials implied an additional burden as many could not understand 
what was included in the documentation. The problems that this generated were 
compounded by lack of translation services in most public offices. Second, 
sometimes the degree of dissagregation of the statistical data required by the 
DOC was well beyond what is customary. Furthermore, absence of human 
resources and underdeveloped communication technology implied that even if 
available, the required information could not be easily put into a standard 
format. For example, regarding loans to the industry, the DOC handled a form 
that had to be filled with information for each beneficiary under each of the 
programs included in the Petition. Often lack of personnel made it impossible 
for the government offices and bank branches where this form was sent, to 
complete them in the detail required by the DOC.  
 
Summing-up, although it is true that many layers of Government are disorganized 
and that here there is much room for improvement, the nature and complexities of the 
investigation of the margin of subsidy by the DOC created demands that were difficult if 
not impossible to meet. Some of the problems encountered in the attempts for orchestrating 
the defense included lack of financial resources and a quite widespread absence of 
knowledge on WTO regulations and their implications. What happened during this process 
also illustrates that a rules-based system requires knowledge and financial resources for  
complying and ensuring compliance by other Members. Without these elements in place, a 
rules-based system can end up benefiting some Members more than others. 
 
2. Defense in the dumping investigation 
 
Although the responsibility for the defense in dumping cases falls primarily on the 
firms selected by the DOC, which in practice were the largest exporters, it should be said 
that neither the national nor provincial governments played any significant role in assisting 
these enterprises. This as I shall argue, is in contrast with the cohesion between some layers  
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of the US Government and its honey producers for organizing themselves and obtaining the 
necessary financing for initiating the AD and CVD cases.   
 
Regarding the structuring of the defense by Argentina’s exporters there were two 
alternative paths that they could follow: (i) they could choose to implement a united front 
by for example, agreeing to collaborate and split the costs of the legal fees or alternatively, 
(ii) they could go their own way on the expectation that differential firm-specific 
antidumping duties would benefit some at the expense of the others. Following the 
traditional rivalry that apparently has characterized their behavior, the exporting firms 
selected the second strategy
23. It is of interest to contrast this behavior with the high degree 
of cohesion shown by US honey producers which I address next. 
 
3. US cohesion in building the petition 
 
  A few comments illustrate several differences between the building of the petition 
by the US honey producers and the defense of Argentina. Early in 2000, the American 
Honey Producers Association (AHPA) published in several bee and honey specialized 
journals, a note to beekeepers notifying them that the legal firm “Collier, Shanon, Rill and 
Scott” had expressed that there was a reasonable expectation that an antidumping case 
against Argentina and China would be successful because “current prices are about the 
same as when we won the previous antidumping action against China”
24.  
 
In order to arrive at a better assessment of its chances in a new antidumping case, in 
its letter AHPA recommended a contribution of $35,000 dollars required to undertake a 
study on: (i) the situation in Argentina, (ii) the situation in India which in the 1995 
investigation was the surrogate country for China and, (iii) an assessment of the injury on 
                                                 
23 Nevertheless, for the injury investigation twelve exporting firms came up with $100,000 dollars to pay the 
legal services. This cost was split in proportion to their export value. 
 
24 This notice appeared for example in the June 10, 2000 of “Bee Culture”. According to this article, the 
expectation was that a new AD measure would put $20 millions in the pocket of beekeepers during the first 
year.  
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the US honey industry. Furthermore, AHPA surveyed the readiness of beekeepers to pay 
$700,000 dollars as legal fees to the above-mentioned firm for managing the case.  
 
Therefore, a first contrasting difference with Argentina is that US beekeepers are 
well organized and have efficient umbrella organizations capable of coordinating their 
actions. A second difference was that the US beekeepers had the advantage of a previous 
case won against China which permitted a better assessment of their chances in a new case. 
A third difference is that they have money. 
 
Two other aspects are of interest. First, there appears to have been a number of 
articles in honey oriented journals and magazines that helped to prepare an environment of 
finger-pointing against Argentina. For example, one article commissioned by APHA 
asserted that some exporters in Argentina make money “from the blood” of beekeepers. 
There was also a presentation by an Argentina beekeeper at the Annual Meeting of AHPA 
who expressed that the biggest enemies of Argentina’s honey producers are its exporters 
and US importers (Braunstein, 2000); a shot in the foot. 
 
Finally, it is of interest to note that at least the Governor of one of the US honey 
producing states, pledged to pay for part of the legal fees. For example, a note in the Honey 
Producer Magazine of August 29, 2000 indicates that Governor Bill Janklow of South 
Dakota is “contributing $50,000 to help the American Honey Producer Association fight 
against unfair trade practices by Argentina and the People’s Republic of China”. This is in 
contrast to the situation in the Province of Buenos Aires who as said, was unable to pay a 
penny that it had initially pledged. 
 
4. Conclusions  
 
The evidence on the CVD investigation against Argentina shows a clear 
disarticulation of different layers of  Government for defending itself. In the end, the crucial 
role was played by its legal representation, and by a couple of Government officials who  
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took the challenge of defending this case with great energy but without any financial 
support.  
 
The defense of the dumping investigation appears to have been weakened by a 
number of factors including a level of sophistication of the investigation that was well 
above the capacities of most beekeepers in Argentina. The industry never came close to 
presenting a unified front. This situation is in sharp contrast to the organizational strength  
of US beekeepers to build their case in the form of a strong petition and later, to fight 
successfully the arguments of the defense. Furthermore, the evidence indicates a high 
degree of cohesiveness between the US private sectors and different layers of governments 
that was never present in Argentina. This cohesiveness also included financial support by 
governments of honey-producing States to pay for the legal costs of this case. Finally, US 
producers were protected by new regulations negotiated in the Uruguay Round and it is 
unclear whether developing countries´ negotiators were aware that these reforms could turn 
out to be so damaging to their exports
25.    
 
 
V. Some Impacts of the US Protectionist Measures 
 
  This section starts by analyzing  the important shifts in the direction of honey trade 
during the investigation, and following the final AD and CVD determinations. This 
analysis includes a discussion of the recently implemented sanitary-induced import ban on 
China’s honey by major importers. Then I present a brief discussion of how the US 
protectionist measures may affect poverty. Finally, I conclude with an analysis on the cost 
of protection to US consumers.  
 
1. Trade effects of the US measures 
                                                 
25 Regarding the new WTO CVD rules the referee of this paper asserts that the “United States probably 
provided this particular paragraph (new rules for rebating indirect taxes), it seems to be a frustration over 50 
years of struggle with the European Union over rebate of indirect taxes being allowed, but not rebate of direct 
taxes. It is also evidence of the technical capacity of the US to plant these little mines in many places, hidden 
from the unwary. (The objective is more to blow off legs than to prevent anyone from crossing the territory)”. 
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  Recently, the world honey market has been affected by two major disruptions. First, 
the administrative procedures and successive findings leading to the affirmative AD and 
CVD decisions by the DOC had clear effects even during before the final orders issued in 
December 2001. More recently in 2002, the findings of antibiotic residues has led major 
honey importing countries to ban imports from China
26. In order to distinguish these effects 
more clearly, I divide the discussion according to what the data shows for 2001 when there 
were no sanitary problem, and for 2002 . 
 
1.1 Trade impacts in 2001  
 
There is no doubt that the US trade measures had devastating effects on Argentina’s and 
China’s honey exports to the US, and this occurred even during 2001 when the 
investigations by the DOC and the ITC were still underway. Table 5 shows that in 2001, 
US honey imports from Argentina declined by 55%, and those from China by 33%. 
Although Canada would had been a natural source to replace at least some imports from the 
affected countries, the figures indicate that this did not occur probably because in 2001 the 
honey harvest was not that good
27. Instead, the data indicates that the US increased imports 
from many other countries and particularly from Vietnam, Mexico and Uruguay. In spite of 
this apparent market substitution, overall US imports (in tons) during 2001 were 26% 
below the level recorded in 2000. 
                                                 
26 The analysis and conclusions presented in this paper are not affected by the devaluation and policy 
mismanagement that has characterized Argentina during 2002.    
 
27 Statistics from FAO indicate that during 2001Canada produced 32,000 tons which was approximately the 





Graphs  4 and 5 shows US monthly imports (in tons) from Argentina and China. For 
Argentina, the lines indicate that starting in May 2001, shortly after the preliminary 
affirmative determination by the DOC and six months in advance of the final decision,  
imports began to crawl through the zero axis line raising the fears of a major collapse of 
Argentina’s  honey industry. 
  Table 5:Major Suppliers of Honey to the U.S. (tons), 2000 
and 2001 
 Year  2001 
Country 2000  20.472 
Argentina 45.010  17.825 
China 26.633 10.564 
Canada 12.963  5.693 
Vietnam 1.902  4.241 
Mexico 2.085  2.478 
Uruguay 60  1.302 
Thailand 161  921 
Chile 0  611 
Hungary 89  413 
Australia 93  64.520 
Total ten  88.995  65.749 
































Graph 5 shows a similar behavior for US imports coming from China but probably  






























because these imports were already restricted by the previous AD measure, the decline 
during 2001 is not as intense as that shown for Argentina but in any case, it is substantial. 
This trade effect during the DOC´s investigation has been noticed in other studies. For 
example, Staiger and Wolak (1996, p. 86) concluded that “…the effect of a typical  
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antidumping investigation is to reduce imports during the period of investigation by 
roughly half the reduction that could be expected if antidumping duties had been imposed 
from the beginning of the investigation…”. As shown in graphs 4 and 5, this decline is  
noticeable after the preliminary affirmative findings which were published in March 2001.  
This happens because preliminary positive determinations carry with them “…the 
liability of duty assessment for all imports entering thereafter if a final affirmative dumping 
determination is subsequently made…” (Staiger and Wolak, 1996, p.86). In the case of 
honey, the earlier AD measure against China implied a high likelihood that this would be 
the final result.   
 
1.2 Trade impacts in 2002: the sanitary-induced import ban on China 
 
On January 25, 2002 the EU Standard Veterinary Committee (SVC) voted “… in 
favor of a Commission proposal to suspend imports of Chinese products of animal origin 
intended for human consumption, or for use in animal feed…The main products affected by 
the suspension in volume terms are honey, rabbit meat, poultry and crustaceans such as 
shrimps and prawns. A recent mission of the EU´s Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) 
revealed serious deficiencies of the Chinese residue control system and problems related to 
the use of banned substances in the veterinary field” (EUSVC, 2002 in www.europa.gov). 
In the case of honey, the residues refer to streptomycin and chloramphenicol above the 
levels allowed by the EU (EUSVC, 2002)
28.  
 
More recently on August 28, 2002, the US Customs Service has begun to follow the 
earlier steps by the EU after it found several containers with chloramphenicol. Moreover, 
the Customs Service has detected that “…in an effort to evade US Antidumping duties, this 
honey had allegedly been illegally transshipped through third-party countries on its way 
from China to America” (US Customs Office, 2002). Apparently, transshipment has taken 
place through Thailand.  
 
                                                 
28 This residues have been associated with anemia and cancer. Europe has banned the use of this antibiotic in 
animals or their products which are destined for human consumption.  
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This decision has created a supply shortage that has led to a process of accelerated 
increases in honey prices around the world. Obviously this situation is benefiting other 
exporting countries including Argentina whose exports (in dollar terms) for the first six 
months of 2002 have increased by 28% on a yearly basis
29. 
 
  Graph 6 shows for example, monthly honey exports of Argentina since January of 
2000. It is seen that starting in April 2002, monthly exports are above the level in 2000 
which was a record exporting year. The data also shows as expected, that exports are 
growing particularly fast to countries other than the US. Germany which is the major 
unrestricted buyer, is one important destination where exports from Argentina are growing  




























fast; exports to this destination for the first five months of 2002, are 47% above the level in 
2001 (www.beekeeping.com). 
  Summing-up, the US AD and CVD investigations brought to a sudden stop the 
dynamic process of honey exports from Argentina to the US. During the 90s, Argentina’s 
                                                 
29 In quantity terms, exports during this period are up by only 1%.  
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competitiveness showed itself in a strong export performance. In order to reduce the speed 
of decline of the US honey industry, producers made sure that all major suppliers were 
included in the new allegations of being unfair traders. The initial trade effect reduced US 
imports dramatically and in this sense, and only in this sense, producers were successful. 
More recently, the sanitary induced import ban against China by major industrial country 
importers has added another destabilizing element to the world honey market.    
 
2. Social impacts of protectionist measures  
 
Under normal circumstances, we would expect that US protection of honey 
producers would lead to a reduction of international prices with negative effects on the 
incomes of beekeepers over the world. Given that many of these people are poor or very 
poor, protection against honey imports by the world leading importer will have poverty 
increasing effects. A few comments illustrate what is at work but a more precise assessment 
requires further analysis and additional data. 
 
Although protection reduces international prices, the poverty increasing effects are 
felt with particular intensity in the countries targeted by the US trade measures; in this case, 
Argentina and China. The estimates suggests that China has around 200,000 beekeepers 
while in Argentina the number is around 25,000
30. As in Argentina, most of China’s honey 
producers own a low number of bee colonies (around fifty), and only a few are estimated to 
be operating 300 colonies or more (Alberta, 2001 page 40). Furthermore, the indirect 
employment effects can also be very serious. For example, the Alberta study estimates that 
the honey industry in Argentina provides employment to around 60,000 persons many if 
not most of them being family members
31.   
In Argentina, a small producer is considered to have less than 50 beehives while a 
big producer is one who has more than 500 and according to estimates from the Secretaría 
                                                 
30 The estimate for China is from www.beekeeping.com, and that for Argentina  from the Secretaría de 
Agricultura.   
31 It should also be said that due to the pattern of floral sources that characterizes China,  much of the honey 
produced here comes from the efforts of migratory beekeepers which is an added element increasing their 
hardships (Alberta, 2001).  
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de Agricultura, only 3% of producers have more than 500 beehives. The beehives owned by 
the remaining producers are distributed in the following way: 1) 12% own from 350 to 500, 
2) 75% own between 20 and 350 and, 3) 10% own less than 20
32.  
 
An estimate from the Secretaría de Agricultura is that in 1998 the annual net income 
for the honey producer was around $0.30 dollars per kilo. Assuming that each beehive 
produces 35 kilos of honey, then a producer with 300 beehives would had netted $3,150 
dollars or around $300 dollars per month. To put this in contrast, this amount is less than 
half the average income received by the people in the honey producing zone which are 
located mainly in the Provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fé, Córdoba, Entre Rios and La 
Pampa
33. These figures clearly indicate that for most producers, honey sales allow an 
extremely low standard of living. 
 
In addition to the fact that honey production offers at best a subsistence income, 
beekeepers in Argentina as in other parts of the world, are also exposed to important 
uncertainties associated with: (i) fluctuations in international prices, (ii) unstable climatic 
conditions and, (iii) pest-related risks and uncertainties. Clearly, a protectionist trade 
measure by the major world honey importer can have devastating effects primarily on the 
beekeepers in the affected countries but also, through international price reductions, on 
those in other countries.  
 
3. Prices and cost to US consumers  
 
  The purpose of this last comment, is to present an estimate of the impact of the trade 
measures on the cost of honey paid by US consumers. Under the present circumstances of 
the international honey market, this estimation is not straightforward. Under normal 
circumstances, we would expect that the US protective measures would increase domestic 
                                                 
32 Given that in 2000 the number of bee colonies in Argentina is estimated to have been 2.2 millions, the 
average number per beekeeper is 88. For other countries, breakdown of the number of beekeepers according 
to the number of colonies owned is apparently not available in the web. 
 
33 Information taken from the Encuesta de Hogares (household survey) published the the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC).. 
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prices while depressing world prices.  Nevertheless, as Graph 7 shows, international prices 
approximated by Argentina’s unit export values started to increase in late 2001 and this 
trend accelerated in 2002. For example, while unit prices were in the order of  $0.98 dollars 
per kilo in June of 2001, the price for the same month in 2002 was $ 1.35 dollars per kilo; 
an increase of 38%.  In part this increase must be attributed to the sanitary measures against 
imports from China imposed by big industrial countries. Under these circumstances: What 
are the consumer costs of the US AD and CVD duties? 























  It is not straightforward to separate the price and trade effects of these duties from 
those induced by the import bans on China
34. Furthermore, US importers may be partially 
succeeding in switching sources of honey supply from Argentina and China to other 
countries. For example, while in 2000 Argentina and China accounted for 77% of US 
honey imports, during the first four months of 2002, they accounted for only 25%
35.   
 
                                                 
34 To be sure, there has been no major change in the US MFN rate which has remained at $1.9 dollar cents per 
kilo (www.dataweb.usitc.gov).  In contrast, the EU charges a flat ad-valorem duty of 17.3% on honey 
imports. Methodologies for assessing the trade effects of contingent protection in the absence of complicating 
factors are presented in Hufbauer and Elliot (1994) and ITC (2002). 
 
35 Because as said, apparently some countries have been transshipping honey from China, the true substitution 
that has taken place is lower than what the numbers in the text suggest.   
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Clearly, many forces are at play. Furthermore, as the number of countries banning 
imports from China continues to increase (Canada has recently followed the EU and the 
US), the web of substitution effects surrounding the trade and sanitary measures becomes 
increasingly complex. Therefore in order to offer a back of the envelope estimate of the 
consumer costs associated with the US AD and CVD measures against Argentina and 
China, I will rely on the following simple assumptions: (i) in 2000 the US honey market 
was close to equilibrium, (ii) imported and domestic honey are perfect substitutes
36, (iii) the 
price elasticity of demand  is –0.5%,  and, (iv) the increase in consumer prices triggered by 
the trade measures is 20%. This is only a fraction of the average AD duty but given the 
evidence on market substitution possibilities that US importers have faced in the past, this 
appears to be more reasonable than assuming that the price increase will be equal to the 
average AD duty which is around 50%.  
 
In 2000 US honey consumption was 179,143 tons while the retail price of honey 
was around $7.00 per kilo
37. Under these assumptions, the extra costs that US consumers 
will pay on account of AD and CVD duties is in the order of $238 million dollars.  
 
VI. Development and the Doha Round 
 
  The analysis presented above, suggest a number of development topics that require 
attention in the Doha negotiations.  
 
Development potential of honey exports. Millions of people around the world are making a 
living from honey production and for them, a free and competitive world market would 
strengthen their possibilities of raising their standards of living. Nevertheless, the US trade 
actions have reduced or eliminated the hope that this could become a reality any time soon. 
The 1995 AD measure against China was bad enough, but the new measures implemented 
in 2001 have increased the likelihood that the world honey market will continue to be 
                                                 
36 The discussion presented by the ITC report suggests that the elasticity of substitution is very high (ITC, 
2001).  
37 Domestic consumption is estimated as production (94,000 tons) plus net imports (85,143 tons). Average 
retail prices are estimated from various issues of the American Bee Journal.  
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shocked by protectionist measures. The sequential pattern of increasing and widening 
protectionism followed by the US to include successful exporters under the effects of its 
contingent protection measures, sends a clear message that other countries should think 
twice before investing in expanding honey exports to the US. One lesson from the events of 
the last decade is that becoming a successful honey exporter is more likely to make 
beekeepers from exporting countries poorer rather than richer. In this way, an industry that 
is very close to poor people all over the world and that should be fostered and stabilized, is 
in fact being severely harmed by discriminatory trade policies. 
 
Economics of adjustment vs. economics of litigation. In spite of the clear lobbying success 
that by now spans more than five decades of support, the US honey producing industry 
continues to decline. Probably the millions of dollars spent in: (i) public support programs 
financed with US taxpayers money, (ii) legal fees in the antidumping cases and in the 
countervailing case, (iii) legal fees in earlier safeguard cases, (iv) the costs of the 
administrative resources invested by the DOC, the ITC and the targeted countries and, (v) 
the opportunity costs of private resources allocated to rent-seeking activities, plus the costs 
to US consumers, would had been sufficient to finance an orderly program for down-sizing 
the US honey industry. Despite the clear economics of the case, this line of action has 
apparently, never been seriously considered. Perhaps the time has come to compare this 
alternative to the very costly one that has been followed for so long.   
 
Development, antidumping and the Doha Round. The analysis in this paper validates the 
criticism of regulatory protectionism by many renowned analysts. For example, in the case 
of the US, Palmeter (1991), has concluded that: “…the procedure it uses and the 
implementation of these standards and procedures by the Department of Commerce 
increasingly ensure that, at the end of the day, an exporter determined to have been selling 
below fair value probably has been doing no such thing in any meaningful sense of the 
word fair”
38. The analysis I have presented suggests that what was unfair in the 
antidumping case were not the US honey imports from Argentina and China, but 
regulations and administrative procedures that allow the imposition of very high duties 
                                                 
38 Cited in Finger (1993, page 31).  
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against beekeepers that never had a real chance of defending their situation. These 
regulations and sophistications can perhaps be dealt by major manufacturing enterprises but 
are well above what poor people in the agricultural sectors of developing countries are able 
to deal with.  Leveling the playing field requires an agreement that the poorest segments of 
developing countries should not be faced with sophisticated questionnaires for which we 
know beforehand, that they are not capable to of responding
39. At the very least, 
negotiations aimed at solving these negative development impacts, require a reformulation 
of Article 15 of the Antidumping Code providing more clear rights to developing countries. 
As it now stands, this Article only offers empty words and if in the Doha Round 
negotiations fail to give it teeth, then in order to strengthen the integrity and transparency of 
the trading system, it should be dropped
40.  
 
Agriculture, countervailing measures and the Doha Round. A similar recommendation 
applies to countervailing investigations. The determinations arrived by the DOC in the 
interpretation of policies like Argentina’s reintegro program are made possible by WTO 
rules that are difficult if not impossible to implement. This CVD case touches on many 
issues of the Doha Round including: (i) the treatment of dispersed agricultural industries, 
(ii) the acknowledgement of structural constraints that impede the development of efficient 
tax systems and, (iii) the good faith implementation by developed countries of promises 
made in the Uruguay Round. Again the discussion here , illustrates several instances where 
some of the good intentions that are now written in the WTO agreements are not being 
implemented. The minor if at all existing subsidy that may have been present in 
Argentina’s honey exports contrast with WTO rules that allow massive export subsidies by 
industrial countries to their agricultural exports; these subsidies certainly impoverish 
developing countries (World Bank and IMF, 2002 and WTO, 2002) for agricultural 
                                                 
39 One alternative would be to forbid the method of reconstructing cost when imports come from developing 
countries.  
40 This article reads as follows: “It is recognized that special regard must be given by developed country 
Members to the special situation of developing country Members when considering the application of anti-
dumping measures under this Agreement. Possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this 
Agreement shall be explored before applying anti-dumping duties where they would affect the essential 
interests of developing country Members”. This Article is being addressed in the Doha negotiations and I 
hope that the analysis presented in this paper is a positive contribution to these discussions.  
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products. This is why a world without export subsidies, as proposed by the US and the 
Cairns Group in the Doha negotiations, would be a better world.  
 
Finally, given the multilateral efforts for achieving the world poverty targets, 
regulations for managing contingent protection could make room for poverty assessments 
associated with these measures. This suggestion appears to apply with particular force to 
agricultural products like honey where an important number of poor people around the 
world make a living, and where it is crystal clear that they have no possibility of 
underselling without risking putting themselves and their families closer to indigence.  The 
Doha Development Round should be the appropriate forum to address the poverty effects 
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